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INTRODUCTION

In June 2017, the United States shot down a manned enemy
aircraft for the first time in nearly twenty years. 1 The aircraft
belonged to Syria’s Assad regime and reportedly was dropping
bombs near the United States-backed Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF) south of Tabqah, Syria. 2 The United States intervened to
protect the SDF—a non-state actor partner in the war against the
Islamic State—claiming “collective self-defense.”3 This was the first
time any UN Member State openly invoked collective self-defense,
which is generally understood as the right of states to defend other
states under international law, to justify an attack on another state in
defense of a non-state actor.4 In February 2018, the United States did
so again, conducting strikes against Syria in the name of collective

1
The last time the United States shot down a manned aircraft was during the
Kosovo campaign in 1999. See Ryan Browne, New details on US shoot down of Syrian
jet,
CNN
(June
21,
2017,
10:17
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/21/politics/us-syria-russiadogfight/index.html [https://perma.cc/KPD9-ZKS5]; US coalition downs first Syria
government jet, BBC (June 19, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-40322666 [https://perma.cc/66EP-6VVM].
2
CJTF-OIR, Coalition Defends Partner Forces from Syrian Fighter Jet Attack, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND (June 19, 2017), https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWSARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1217917/coalition-defends-partnerforces-from-syrian-fighter-jet-attack [https://perma.cc/5F6L-KHPA] [hereinafter
Central Command News Article]; see also Oona Hathaway, Turkey is violating
international law. It took lessons from the U.S., WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/10/22/turkey-is-violatinginternational-law-it-took-lessons-us
[https://perma.cc/B5MG-HNA6]
(stating that the Trump administration claimed “collective self-defense of Coalition
partnered forces” to justify the downing of the Syrian aircraft in June 2017).
3
See CJTFOIR, Coalition Defends Partner Forces from Syrian Fighter Jet Attack,
U.S.
CENTRAL
COMMAND
(June
18,
2017),
https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-ReleaseView/Article/1217892/coalition-defends-partner-forces-from-syrian-fighter-jetattack [https://perma.cc/EB9H-N9BV] [hereinafter Central Command Press
Release].
4
See Elvina Pothelet, U.S. Military’s “Collective Self-Defense” of Non-State
Partner Forces: What Does International Law Say?, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/61232/collective-self-defense-partner-forcesinternational-law-say [https://perma.cc/5KAA-P6XF]. To be sure, this is not the
first time a state has sponsored non-state actors in foreign states. Nor would this
be the first time a state has attacked another state in self-defense. But this is the first
time a state has openly attacked another state in self-defense of a non-state partner.
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self-defense of the SDF.5 This latest twist in the state practice of selfdefense under international law has largely escaped scholarly
attention, despite its far-reaching consequences for the UN Charter
and the future of war itself.6
The scope of self-defense under international law has continued
to expand since the UN Charter was ratified in 1945. Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter prohibits states from using military force, but the
Charter also provides an exception for self-defense in the event of
an armed attack. 7 The self-defense exception to the use-of-force
prohibition, codified at Article 51 of the UN Charter, is narrow by
design. 8 But it has grown over time to include more proactive

5 See Jeffrey Harrigian, Department of Defense Press Briefing by Lieutenant General
Harrigian via teleconference from Al Udeid Airbase, Qatar, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Feb. 13,
2018),
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1441080
[https://perma.cc/P9PA-TRL8]; Thomas Gribbons-Neff, How a 4-Hour Battle
Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos Unfolded in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (May
24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/americancommandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html
[https://perma.cc/VWG4-UJVK];
Terri Moon Cronk, Pentagon Official Describes Response to Attack by Pro-Regime Syrian
Forces,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
DEF.
(Feb.
8,
2018),
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1436435/pentagonofficial-describes-response-to-attack-by-pro-regime-syrian-forces
[https://perma.cc/HZ2E-8QC2]; Dana W. White, Department of Defense Press
Briefing by Pentagon Chief Spokesperson Dana W. White in the Pentagon Briefing Room,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
DEF.
(Feb.
8,
2018),
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1436566/
department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-chief-spokesperson-dana-wwhit [https://perma.cc/US2G-9ADC] (“Yesterday, Syrian Democratic Forces acted
in self-defense with support from the coalition to defeat an unprovoked attack by
Syrian pro-regime forces in eastern Syria.”).
6
See Pothelet, supra note 4 (explaining that given the participatory nature of
international law, states must share their interpretation of relevant treaty provisions
and opinio juris regarding possible customary rules in the area of self-defense, else
militarily active states will continue to take “life-and-death decisions on the basis
of unchallenged legal views.”).
7
See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations”); see also Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, On Syria, a
U.N.
Vote
Isn’t
Optional,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
3,
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/opinion/on-syria-a-un-vote-isntoptional.html [https://perma.cc/VQJ6-99YL] (calling the prohibition and its
exception “the most fundamental international rule of all.”).
8
U.N. Charter art. 51; see also Hathaway, supra note 2 (noting the self-defense
exception applies only where there has been an “armed attack” and not merely an
arms buildup).
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interpretations of “defense,” including preemptive and anticipatory
self-defense.9
The rise of non-state actors has enabled states to strain and
stretch the interpretation of self-defense under Article 51.10 In the
post-September 11 world, some states—chiefly the United States—
argue that self-defense is a legitimate justification for military action
against non-state actors like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The
“Bush Doctrine” was a policy of preemptive self-defense that
explicitly declared that the “the war on terror will not be won on the
defensive,”11 and the “Bethlehem Principles,” penned by then Legal
Adviser to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Daniel
Bethlehem, have become a template for justifying military action
against non-state actors.12 But these legal arguments concern Article
51 action against non-state actors. At issue in the June 2017
shootdown is use of force by a UN member state against a state actor
in defense of a non-state actor.
The refashioning of Article 51 self-defense as a doctrinal vehicle
for military action by states on behalf of non-state partners against
other states constitutes a major development that warrants serious
scholarly debate. Left alone and taken to its logical conclusion, this
development would allow any state to justify military action against
another state—even in the absence of a direct threat to the former
state’s territory, personnel, or assets—by merely designating a nonstate group as a “partner force” and then acting to protect said
group.13 The rationale undercuts the Charter’s bedrock prohibition
9
See Hathaway, supra note 2. In 1984, following the bombings of the United
States’ Embassy in Beirut, President Ronald Reagan issued a national security
directive claiming that “[w]henever we have evidence that a state is mounting or
intends to conduct an act of terrorism against us, we have a responsibility to take
measures to protect our citizens, property, and interests.” Id.
10
See id.
11
Id.
12
See Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed
Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 770, 773 (2012):

There is little intersection between the academic debate and the
operational realities . . . The reality of the threats, the consequences of
inaction, and the challenges of both strategic appreciation and operational
decision making in the face of such threats frequently trump a doctrinal
debate that has yet to produce a clear set of principles that effectively
address the specific operational circumstances faced by states.
13
See generally Letter from Tim Kaine, U.S. Sen., to James Mattis, Sec’y of Def.,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Def.
(Oct.
2,
2018),
https://www.scribd.com/document/390037794/Kaine-Presses-Trump-
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on the use of force and, with it, the stability of the international
system itself.
This Comment takes seriously the threat that such a
development presents to the international system and argues that it
is unlawful for a UN Member State to invoke Article 51 to justify the
use of force against another state in defense of a non-state actor. The
Comment proceeds in four parts. Part II offers an overview of the
expansion of self-defense under international law over time,
focusing on the ways self-defense against non-state actors has
pushed Article 51’s limits in the post-9/11 era. Part III critiques the
possible legal pathways that might provide justification for a UN
member state acting on behalf of non-state actor partners, and Part
IV then addresses the sole lawful path available to a UN member
state that seeks to act in self-defense of a non-state actor. Finally,
Part V concludes by exploring the dangerous implications of nonstate actor collective self-defense for the UN system and, by
extension, the international order.
II.

SELF-DEFENSE UNDER THE UN CHARTER

The United Nations is an organization of states, by states, and
for states. Although non-state actors have long been a feature of the
international system, the UN Charter regulates only States and, by
extension, state-sponsored force. However, non-state actors—such
as terrorist organizations, transnational criminal networks, and
revolutionary movements—employ force free from the Charter’s
constraints and thus complicate the Charter’s state-centric approach.
In response to the divide between the Charter’s legal fiction and
reality, some UN member states have expansively read Article 51 to
allow use of force against non-state actors. After the September 11
attacks, the United States argued that it could act in Article 51 selfdefense against a non-state actor located inside another state
without that state’s consent—an argument now known as the
“unable or unwilling” doctrine because it is predicated on a finding
that the state harboring the non-state actor is unable or unwilling to
neutralize the threat. Though the “unable or unwilling” doctrine
remains hotly contested among states and international law scholars
alike, the United States has now built another strained legal
Administration-on-the-Expansive-Use-of-Collective-Self-Defense-to-JustifyMilitary-Action-That-Bypasses-Congress [https://perma.cc/X3SX-MART].
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argument atop its shaky foundation by arguing that it may act in
collective self-defense of the SDF in Syria. This argument amounts
to an assertion that a non-state actor may act in its own self-defense
under international law and, therefore, a UN member state may act
in collective self-defense of that non-state actor under Article 51 of
the UN Charter. Such an argument had never been invoked until
the June 2017 shootdown near Raqqa, and it threatens to further
unravel the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. This Part
contextualizes this latest development in Article 51 self-defense by
exploring the ongoing effort to insert non-state actors into the
international legal regime governing the use of force, highlighting
just how controversial such efforts remain.
a. Self-Defense Under the UN Charter
Two provisions in the UN Charter govern self-defense: Articles
2(4) and 51. Article 2(4) prohibits the “threat or use of force in
international relations,” and creates only a narrow set of exceptions
to this prohibition.14 The most often invoked exception to Article
2(4) is self-defense, which is codified at Article 51 of the UN
Charter. 15 The UN Charter’s drafters included an explicit selfdefense exception16 in order to circumscribe the right of self-defense.
Thus, Article 51 creates a narrow exception for individual and
collective self-defense where a UN member state has suffered an
“armed attack”—in other words, a grave violation of Article 2(4)’s
prohibition on the use of force.17 But not all uses of force in violation
of Article 2(4) rise to the level of an “armed attack” and thus enable
a state to properly invoke Article 51 self-defense. In this and other

U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
16
Id. The documents establishing the League of Nations only reassured states
of an implicit exception for the inherent right of self-defense under customary
international law, which proved insufficient.
17
See Adil Ahmad Haque, The United Nations Charter at 75: Between Force and
SECURITY
(June
24,
2020),
Self-Defense—Part
One,
JUST
https://www.justsecurity.org/70985/the-united-nations-charter-at-75-betweenforce-and-self-defense-part-one/ [https://perma.cc/V5RJ-UPNV].
14
15
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ways, Article 51 recognizes a restricted right of self-defense under
international law.18
There are numerous contexts in which a state may act in selfdefense against a non-state actor, but Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN
Charter do not apply with equal force in all such scenarios. This
Comment focuses narrowly on instances where State A uses force in
self-defense against a non-state actor located inside State B without
State B’s consent.19 When State A uses force in self-defense against
a non-state actor located inside State B without State B’s consent,
State A has attacked State B even if State A claims the target of its
attack was the non-state actor group within State B and not State B
itself. Furthermore, this scenario is most akin to the reality in Syria,
where the United States employs force without the Syrian regime’s
consent.20
18
Article 51 broke with the right of self-defense as it existed under customary
international law (i.e., the standard set forth in the Caroline incident). The 1837
Caroline incident has long been understood as the “locus classicus” of the right of
self-defense. See D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (2d prtg.
2009); see also ALBERT B. COREY, THE CRISIS OF 1830-1842 IN CANADIAN-AMERICAN
RELATIONS 61-69 (1941) (describing tensions between the United States, Great
Britain, and rebels from “the Canadas” following British forces’ destruction of the
Canadian ship Caroline); CRAIG FORCESSE, DESTROYING THE CAROLINE: THE FRONTIER
RAID THAT RESHAPED THE RIGHT TO WAR 7-56 (2018) (providing further historical
context to the conflict); Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins, Jr., The Caroline Incident
and the Development of International Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 493, 496-500 (1990)
(explaining that the diplomatic response to the Caroline incident precipitated
refinement and elaboration of the meaning of self-defense); R.Y. Jennings, The
Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 82-92 (1938) (recounting the legal
and diplomatic repercussions following the Caroline incident that prompted critical
evaluation of self-defense and attempts to define its contours).
19
Thus, instances where (1) State A attacks a non-state actor inside its own
territory (what has at been referred to as “internal jus ad bellum,” see Eliav Lieblich,
What Law Applies to the Resort to Force Against Non-State Actors? Filling the Void of
“Internal
Jus
Ad
Bellum,”
JUST
SECURITY
(Oct.
18,
2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/33664/law-applies-resort-force-non-state-actorsfilling-void-internal-jus-ad-bellum [https://perma.cc/NV66-QNLZ]; (2) State A
obtains State B’s consent to attack a non-state actor located in State B, and (3) nonstate actors act from territory uncontrolled by a sovereign state (e.g., terra nullius
or the high seas) are beyond this Comment’s scope. See Michael J. Adams & Ryan
Goodman, Category Mistake: There Is No Jus ad Bellum for Use of Force Against NonState
Actors,
JUST
SECURITY
(Dec.
13,
2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/35482/category-mistake-jus-ad-bellum-force-nonstate-actors [https://perma.cc/PS2B-HF42] (arguing that in these three instances,
jus ad bellum simply does not apply).
20
See Reuters Staff, Syrian government: U.S. military presence in Syria is act of
(Jan.
18,
2018,
4:51
AM),
aggression,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-usa/syrian-government-u-
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b. The Narrow View of Self-Defense
The scope of Article 51 self-defense is open to narrow and broad
interpretation. The narrow (consensus) view emphasizes states’
centrality to the international order and is marked by a reluctance to
bring non-state actors into the international legal fold.
Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force binds only UN
Member states. 21 Furthermore, this prohibition is “universally
accepted as a norm of customary international law.”22 Because an
“armed attack” under Article 51 is understood to be a particularly
grave use of force in violation of Article 2(4),23 the widely held view
is that only states bound by Article 2(4) can carry out an “armed
attack” sufficient to trigger the right to self-defense under Article
51.24 Thus, attribution of an attack to a state becomes central to statebased self-defense claims under international law.
The UN’s principal judicial organ, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), has continually sought to attribute attacks by armed,
non-state actor groups to a state because only then can the harmed
state legally respond with force. 25 However, the ICJ has been
s-military-presence-in-syria-is-act-of-aggression-idINKBN1F713Y
[https://perma.cc/JL5J-YCY7].
21
See Marko Milanovic, Self-Defense and Non-State Actors: Indeterminacy and the
Jus ad Bellum, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 21, 2010), https://www.ejiltalk.org/self-defenseand-non-state-actors-indeterminacy-and-the-jus-ad-bellum
[https://perma.cc/7AZD-A6D7]. This is no surprise, as it is also the plain meaning
of the provision’s text. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
22
Oliver Dörr, Use of Force, Prohibition of, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF
PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 1 (Anne Peters ed., 2019).
23
This is the view that the ICJ adopted in the 1986 Nicaragua Case. See infra
note 25.
24
Adil Ahmad Haque has most recently furthered this argument in a twopart post on Just Security. Haque, supra note 17 (“Non-State actors cannot ‘use
force’ within the meaning of Article 2(4), and so cannot carry out an ‘armed attack’
within the meaning of article [sic] 51.”); Adil Ahmad Haque, The United Nations
Charter at 75: Between Force and Self-Defense—Part Two, JUST SECURITY (June 24, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/70987/the-united-nations-charter-at-75-betweenforce-and-self-defense-part-two [https://perma.cc/N8FA-CX34].
25
See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27); Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem.
Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 146-47 (Dec. 19).
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hesitant to draw bright-line rules and has “expressly reserved its
position on whether Article 51 requires attribution of the armed
attack to a state.”26
In keeping with the UN Charter’s vision that the right of selfdefense should be a narrow exception to the prohibition on the use
of force, the ICJ has sought to constrain the expansion of self-defense
under international law both before and after the September 11
attacks.27 In the seminal case Nicaragua v. United States, the ICJ relied
on Article 3(g) of the 1974 Resolution on the Definition of
Aggression to hold that an “armed attack” could include aggression
by “armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries” only if they
were sent “by or on behalf of a state” (i.e., attributable to a state).28
After the September 11 attacks, the ICJ, in its Advisory Opinion on
the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, maintained its position in Nicaragua that selfdefense could only be invoked in response to an armed attack “by
one State against another State.” 29 In the most recent ICJ case
concerning the use of force against non-state actors, Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, Uganda claimed it had an Article 51
right of self-defense against a non-state group within the DRC
because the group’s activities were attributable to the DRC.30 Here,
the ICJ re-affirmed that, in order for aggression by a non-state actor
to qualify as an “armed attack” under the meaning of Articles 2(4)
and 51, the non-state actor had to show ties to a sovereign state
recognized under the UN system for its actions to trigger Article
51.31 Even in the post-9/11 world, the ICJ has continued to evaluate
aggression by non-state actors through the state-centric lens and
vocabulary of Article 2(4).

Milanovic, supra note 21.
See Wee Yen Jean, Juris Illuminae Entry, The Use of Force Against Non-State
Actors: Justifying and Delimiting the Exercise of the Right of Self-Defence, 9 SING. L. REV.
at 1, 3 (2017).
28
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27); Wee, supra note 27, at 3.
29
Wee, supra note 27, at 3 (quoting Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136
(July 9), at 139).
30
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem.
Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19).
31
Stephanie A. Barbour & Zoe A. Salzman, ”The Tangled Web”: The Right of
Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors in the Armed Activities Case, 40 INT’L L & POL.
53, 61-62, 64-65, 78 (2008).
26
27
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Many scholars and states have coalesced around the ICJ’s
authoritative view that self-defense under the UN Charter requires
state attribution of the armed attack. Thus, it is widely held among
scholars and UN member states that states cannot legally invoke the
“unable or unwilling” doctrine to justify use of force against a nonstate actor under Article 51. 32 Adil Haque argues that the UN
Charter’s text, context, and purpose indicate that it does not permit
“one State (say, the United States or Turkey) to use armed force on
the territory of another State (say, Syria), without the territorial
State’s consent, targeting a non-State actor.” 33 Numerous Latin
American states, including Brazil and Mexico, have voiced
opposition to the “unable or unwilling” doctrine, but the vast
majority of states have remained silent on the issue.34
c. The Expansive Approach to Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors
Over time, some UN member states—namely the United
States—have pushed the limits of the Charter’s prohibition on the

32
“Restrictivists” like Dire Tladi maintain that even in the post-9/11 order,
self-defense must remain an exceptional right, limited in scope:

There are those arguing vociferously for an expansion of this right to such
an extent that States would be free to use force in the territory of that State,
without that State’s consent or without attribution of the conduct of the
non-State actors to that State. Terrorism, as heinous as it certainly is, does
not offer sufficient reason to depart from the constraints placed by
international law.
Dire Tladi, The Use of Force in Self-Defence against Non-State Actors, Decline of
Collective Security and the Rise of Unilateralism: Whither International Law?, in SELFDEFENCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 14, 89 (Mary Ellen O’Connell, Christian J.
Tams & Dire Tladi eds., 2019).
33
Adil Ahmad Haque, “Clearly of Latin American Origin”: Armed Attack by NonState Actors and the UN Charter, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/66956/clearly-of-latin-american-origin-armedattack-by-non-state-actors-and-the-un-charter [https://perma.cc/3FSU-3EZ8].
34
Pablo Arrocha Olabuenaga, An Insider’s View of the Life-Cycle of Self-Defense
Reports by U.N. Member States, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 2, 2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/63415/an-insiders-view-of-the-life-cycle-of-selfdefense-reports-by-u-n-member-states/
[https://perma.cc/6N7F-5LME];
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Statement by the Permanent
Mission of the El Salvador to the United Nations on Behalf of the Community of
Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (Oct. 3, 2018),
http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/19408950/el-salvador-on-behalf-ofcelac-e-.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6MH-SADW].
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use of force and sought to expand the self-defense exception. 35
Proponents of an expansive definition argue that a non-state actor
can commit an armed attack that triggers Article 51, thereby
allowing the victim-state and its allies to lawfully use force against
the non-state actor. To justify such a position, the link between
Articles 2(4) and 51 must be more ambiguous. 36 As Marko
Milanovic argues:
[T]hat Article 51 operates as an exception to the ban on the
use of inter-state force, does not logically and conceptually
entail that the ‘armed attack’ within the meaning of Article
51 must be attributable to a state. Such a conclusion may
follow from an examination of state practice, but it simply
does not follow from the text of the Charter or from some
broader legal principle, nor from the fact that Article 2(4)
itself is inter-state in operation.37
Under this view, it is not necessary that an armed attack be
attributable to a state to trigger the Article 51 self-defense exception.
Following the September 11 attacks, this approach to self-defense
has gained prominence in large part thanks to the United States’
advocacy.
d. Self-Defense Post-9/11
The September 11 attacks awakened the UN system to the
growing role of non-state actors in international conflict. The rise of
terrorist violence in the twenty-first century has spelled an urgent
problem for the international system because, in its orthodox
interpretation, Article 51 self-defense was thought to apply only “in
the case of an armed attack by one State against another State.” 38
Further erosion of Article 51 self-defense became the pivotal and
35
See DEP’T OF DEF., OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEF. LAW OF WAR
MANUAL ¶ 1.11.5.4 (updated Dec. 2016); Brian Egan, International Law, Legal
Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign: Some Observations, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 235,
239-40 (2016). The United Kingdom—via Daniel Bethlehem, former Legal Adviser
to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—has adopted a similarly expansive view
of self-defense against non-state actors. See Bethlehem, supra note 12.
36
See Milanovic, supra note 21.
37
Id.
38
Monica Hakimi, Defensive Force Against Non-State Actors: The State of Play, 91
INT’L L. STUD. 1, 4-5 (2015) (citing 2004 I.C.J. 136, at 139); Wee, supra note 27 at 1, 3.
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controversial tool in the campaign to establish non-state aggressors
as legitimate targets of force.
The September 11 attacks appeared to produce the unofficial
acceptance in state practice of defensive force against non-state
actors with clear links to another state. The United States and United
Kingdom, in their letters notifying the UN Security Council of their
self-defense operations in Afghanistan, emphasized the Taliban’s
support of al-Qaeda to justify its use of force against the non-state
group on the basis of its sponsorship by another territorial,
sovereign state. 39 Meanwhile, UN Security Council Resolutions
1368 and 1373, calling on “all States to work together urgently to
bring justice to the [9/11] perpetrators,” gave a tacit nod to the
United States’ invocation of self-defense against al-Qaeda. 40 The
majority of UN member states, including Russia and China, also
supported Operation Enduring Freedom against al-Qaeda and the
Taliban in Afghanistan as a legitimate exercise of the right to selfdefense.41
The exact parameters of defensive force against non-state actors
were hotly contested from the outset.42 The United States and some
of its allies openly endorsed the “unwilling or unable” doctrine,
which argues that action against a non-state threat is justified so long
as the state in which the non-state actor resides is “unwilling or
unable” to suppress the threat.43 The list of states either explicitly or
implicitly endorsing the “unwilling or unable” doctrine continues to
grow,44 but the doctrine remains far from the consensus view.
Meanwhile in academia and among policymakers, debates
about the legitimacy of military force against non-state aggressors
Then-legal adviser to the UK Foreign and
rage on. 45
39
Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors: Are
Powerful States Willing but Unable to Change International Law?, 67 INT’L & COMP. L.
Q. 263, 269 (2018).
40
S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 3 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
41
See S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 3 (Sept. 12, 2001).
42
Brunnée & Toope, supra note 39, at 264.
43
See Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, Which States Support the ‘Unwilling and
Unable’
Test?,
LAWFARE
(Oct.
10,
2016,
1:55
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/which-states-support-unwilling-and-unable-test
[https://perma.cc/NR7H-R5E8].
44 Id.
45
See Christian J. Tams, Making Sense of the ‘Armed Attack’ Requirement, in SELFDEFENCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 90, 90 (Mary Ellen O’Connell, Christian J.
Tams & Dire Tladi eds., 2019):
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Commonwealth Office Daniel Bethlehem, in laying out his
eponymous principles justifying defensive force against non-state
actors, took an expansionist position, emphasizing the disconnect
between the academy and the battlefield:
There is little intersection between the academic debate and
the operational realities . . . . The reality of the threats, the
consequences of inaction, and the challenges of both strategic
appreciation and operational decision making in the face of
such threats frequently trump a doctrinal debate that has yet
to produce a clear set of principles that effectively address
the specific operational circumstances faced by states.46
The emergence of the Islamic State (IS) complicated matters
further. With transnational operations and de facto territorial
control over existing sovereign states like Iraq and Syria, IS evaded
straightforward connections to any single state as conventionally
understood in the context of Article 2(4). In 2014, the United States
asserted in an Article 51 letter to the Security Council that states have
the “inherent right of individual and collective selfdefense . . . when . . . the government of the State where the threat is
located is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for

‘[T]wo main camps’ are said to face each other in what is now frequently
(if simplistically) portrayed as an epic argument opposing ‘restrictivists’
and ‘expansionists’ . . . [P]ositions are clearly articulated; academics take
sides–where do you stand on the ‘unwilling or unable’ test; what’s your
view on the ‘Bethlehem Principles’; have you signed the ‘Plea against the
Abusive Invocation of Self-Defence’? . . . .
46
Bethlehem, supra note 12. Expansionists like Themis Tzimas echo
Bethlehem and have acknowledged that:
while on the one hand self-defense constitutes a state-centric right, on the
other hand, and given that it is part of the collective security system, we
cannot fail to take into account the ongoing transformations in relation to
the incursion . . . of non-state actors in the wider framework of collective
security. . . .
Themis Tzimas, Self-Defense by Non-State Actors in States of Fragmented Authority, 24
J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 175, 179 (2019). See also id. at 185:

In other words, the legal personality of non-state actors, especially in the
framework of Areas of Limited Sovereignty or Statehood (ALSs) due to
NIACs and INIACs, is the outcome of the need of state sovereignty to
adjust, normatively speaking, to its own deficiencies and is determined on
the basis of the dialectic relationship between the capacities of the nonstate actor and the defects of the fragmented sovereignty of the state. The
latter necessitate and justify the former.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss1/5

2021]

Self-Defense on Behalf of Non-State Actors

255

[terrorist] attacks.”47 The United States’ argument asserted a scope
of Article 51 self-defense broader than the ICJ’s holding in Nicaragua,
the Definition of Aggression, and the subsequent ICJ cases
upholding the need for substantial ties between a non-state actor
and its sponsoring state. Canada and Australia followed the United
States’ lead with similarly worded Article 51 letters.48
With this proclamation, the “unwilling or unable” doctrine
appeared to bypass the need to establish that there had been an
“armed attack” by showing ties to a sponsoring sovereign state. The
IS attacks in Paris in November 2015 further entrenched the feeling
among some states that self-defense against non-state actors like IS
could be lawful even in the absence of clear ties to a state. Following
the attacks, France stated that its military action in Syria, previously
justified as collective self-defense, could “now also be characterized
as individual self-defence, in accordance with Article 51.” 49 UN
Resolution 2249, calling upon all member states to “redouble and
coordinate their efforts” to “prevent and suppress” IS and other
terrorist groups in the aftermath of the attacks in France, was
unanimously adopted by Security Council members, including
Russia and China.50
Recently, scholars and practitioners alike have introduced new
rationales for defensive force against non-state actors, including the
Chatham House principles,51 the Leiden Policy Recommendations,52
and the Bethlehem Principles,53 all of which assume that self-defense
against non-state actors can be lawful under certain conditions. 54
47
Letter from Samantha J. Power, Rep. of the U.S. to the United Nations, to
Ban Ki-moon, Sec’y-Gen. of the United Nations (Sept. 23, 2014),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/US-Article-51Letter-Syria-09232014.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9DR-CVYF].
48
Brunnée & Toope, supra note 39, at 270.
49
U.N. SCOR, 70th Sess., 7565th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7565 (Nov. 15,
2015).
50
S.C. Res. 2249 (Nov. 20, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council ‘Unequivocally’ Condemns ISIL Terrorist Attacks, Unanimously Adopting
Text and Determines Extremist Group Poses ‘Unprecedented’ Threat, U.N. Press
Release SC/12132 (Nov. 20, 2015).
51
The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in SelfDefence, 55 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 963 ( 2006).
52
Leiden Policy Recommendations on Counter-terrorism and International Law, 57
NETH. INT’L L. REV. 531, 531-50 (2010).
53
Bethlehem, supra note 12.
54
See Christian Marxsen & Anne Peters, Dilution of Self-Defence and its
Discontents, in SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 1, 5–6 (Mary E. O’Connell
et al. eds., 2019).
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According to the first Bethlehem Principle, “states have a right of
self-defense against an imminent or actual armed attack by nonstate
actors.” 55 Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Michael Wood argue that,
under the Chatham and Leiden recommendations, the attack must
be “large-scale” to trigger the right of self-defense if it is by a nonstate group not attributable to a state.56 Another prominent criterion
in determining attribution is the effective control standard, whereby
a “State may take necessary and proportionate action against the
State from whose territory the non-State actors operate, because the
acts of the non-State actors are—from a legal perspective—those of
the State.” 57 The terms of self-defense against non-state actors
remain far from settled.
***
Non-state actors do not exist in a legal black hole; they have
certain obligations under international law. Although the UN
Charter does not directly regulate non-state actors58 —specifically,
armed groups—customary international law (CIL) and international
humanitarian law (IHL) recognize the presence and influence of
such groups on the international system.59 The application of such
bodies of law to non-state actors, however, does not alter their legal
status. For example, Common Article 3 specifies that its application
“shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.”60 Thus,
55
Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of SelfDefense against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L
L.
1
(2012),
https://www.un.org/law/counsel/Bethlehem%20-%20SelfDefense%20Article.pdf [https://perma.cc/86NR-V7Q2].
56
Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Michael Wood, Self-Defense Against Nonstate Actors:
Reflections on the ‘Bethlehem Principles’, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 386, 393 (2013).
57
Marxsen, supra note 54, at 2.
58
Michael Adams and Ryan Goodman have called attempts to apply jus ad
bellum to non-state actors as a “category mistake.” Adams, supra note 19. They
argue that “non-State actors do not possess legal rights like States do and they are
not the relevant subjects of the so-called jus ad bellum” and “conduct by non-State
actors is not regulated by established jus ad bellum.” Id.
59
See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (acknowledging the existence of
“armed conflict not of an international character”); see also International Committee
of the Red Cross, Commentary of 2016, Article 3: Conflicts Not of an International
Nature, ¶¶ 393-94 (“Accordingly, armed conflicts not of an international character
are first of all armed conflicts which oppose the government of a State Party and
one or more non-State Parties.”). Moreover, non-state actor groups are regulated
by the domestic law of the state in which they operate.
60 See, e.g., Article 3 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners
of
War
of
12
August
1949,
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the international law that applies to non-state actors is lopsided: it
places burdens on them while not offering any privileges under
international law. Such an imbalance is necessary to preserve the
state-centric international system.
The doctrinal expansions of the past two decades attest to the
immense legal firepower that has been mobilized toward justifying
non-state actors as lawful targets of force under international law.
In the aftermath of September 11 and the rise of IS, new legal
interpretations emerged to authorize the use of state power against
non-state power. These justifications hinged on the self-defense
right of a state actor against an aggressor non-state actor. But even
in the midst of these expansions, the reverse was never true: not a
single state had yet attempted to invoke the self-defense of a nonstate actor to justify force against a state actor. The remainder of this
Comment is dedicated to exploring this latest twist in the expansion
of self-defense doctrine: the United States’ move to justify the use
of force against another sovereign state on behalf of a non-state actor.
III.

THE CONUNDRUM OF SELF-DEFENSE ON BEHALF OF NONSTATE ACTORS

In June 2017, the United States government took an
unprecedented step when it justified military force against another
sovereign state, the Assad regime in Syria, by invoking the collective
self-defense of a non-state partner, the United States-backed Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF). 61 There are two precarious legal
arguments that might justify this United States action in Syria: (1)
The SDF has a right to individual self-defense under international law
that can then justify the United States’ collective self-defense of the
SDF under Article 51; or (2) the United States can act based on its
own inherent right to individual self-defense under Article 51, which
is triggered because an attack on the SDF is akin to an attack on the
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocitycrimes/Doc.32_GC-III-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH34-KVBM] (acknowledging
the existence of “armed conflict not of an international character”); see also 2016
Commentary
on
the
Geneva
Convention,
393-94,
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&doc
umentId=59F6CDFA490736C1C1257F7D004BA0EC
[https://perma.cc/L755UFME] (“Accordingly, armed conflicts not of an international character are first of
all armed conflicts which oppose the government of a State Party and one or more
non-State Parties.”).
61
Central Command Press Release, supra note 3.
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United States. Both arguments are deeply flawed. This Part first
paints a detailed picture of the June 2017 shootdown before
explaining why this shootdown was illegal under international law.
a. What Happened in Syria?
The Syrian battleground is notoriously chaotic due to the sheer
number of players and interests at stake. It is within this hectic
context that the United States shot down a manned Syrian regime
SU-22 fighter jet on June 18, 2017. The fighter jet had reportedly
“dropped bombs near SDF fighters south of Tabqah,” a city in northcentral Syria near Raqqa.62 It is unclear if the Syrian regime’s attacks
placed any United States servicemembers in danger, but the United
States Department of Defense press release on the strike did not
reference their presence. Instead, it stated: “At 6:43 p.m., a Syrian
regime SU-22 dropped bombs near SDF fighters south of Tabqah
and, in accordance with rules of engagement and in collective selfdefense of Coalition partnered forces, was immediately shot down by a
United States’ F/A-18E Super Hornet.” 63
Because similar
Intelligence Community press releases explaining United States use
of force usually note when United States servicemembers are in
harm’s way,64 this omission in the DoD press release following the
62
Id. A news report issued the next day was identical. See Central Command
News Article, supra note 2.
63
Central Command Press Release, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
64
For example, in early February 2018, a group of more than 500 “Russianspeaking fighters, Syrian government soldiers, and pro-regime militia fighters
attacked a United States-SDF outpost at a former Conoco facility in Deir Ezzor.”
Andrew S. Weiss & Nicole Ng, Collision Avoidance: The Lessons of U.S. and Russian
Operations in Syria, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/03/20/collision-avoidance-lessons-of-u.s.and-russian-operations-in-syria-pub-78571 [https://perma.cc/Y6KE-Q8QV]. The
Pentagon made clear that American lives were at risk in another attack in Syria on
February 7, 2018. See Dep’t. of Def. Press Briefing by Lieutenant Gen. Harrigian via
Teleconference from Al Udeid Airbase, Qatar, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Feb. 13, 2018)
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1441080
[https://perma.cc/AZ5L-F7N4]:

So, I think the first thing I’d remind you of, you know, is this is executed
from self-defense and we’re going to defend ourselves. And as was
reported, there was incoming fire and we were with the SDF hunkered
down, not provoking, and a force is massing and coming at us. So we’re
going to defend ourselves and we all need to be crystal clear about that,
just as Secretary Mattis said. So, we’re going to do that first, defend
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shootdown suggests that only members of the SDF were in danger
on June 18.
The Pentagon press release went on to connect the United States’
attack to the ongoing self-defense mission in Syria: “The Coalition’s
mission is to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The Coalition does not
seek to fight Syrian regime, Russian, or pro-regime forces partnered
with them, but will not hesitate to defend Coalition or partner forces
from any threat.”65 It further argued that “[t]he Coalition presence
in Syria addresses the imminent threat ISIS in Syria poses globally.
The demonstrated hostile intent and actions of pro-regime forces
toward Coalition and partner forces in Syria conducting legitimate
counter-ISIS operations will not be tolerated.”66
However, the United States simply could not hang its hat on the
broader war against ISIS in justifying the June 2017 shootdown. In
2014, the United States filed an Article 51 letter with the United
Nations, justifying its involvement in Syria to counter the rise of ISIS
citing both the individual self-defense of the United States and the
collective self-defense of Iraq.67 This justification amounted to the
“classical” version of collective self-defense—invoked in defense of
another state, Iraq. However, the United States’ attack on a Syrian
jet in collective self-defense of the SDF, a non-state actor, marks a
departure from its war against ISIS and constitutes a distinct
moment from its initial decision to enter Syria in 2014, requiring a
separate legal justification under jus ad bellum. Thus, the United
States could not simply point to its 2014 Article 51 letter to justify the
shootdown.
The June 18 incident was a major inflection point in the Syrian
conflict, and international reactions confirmed that this use of force
could not neatly fit into the category of classical collective selfdefense. The Russian Ministry of Defense swiftly and dramatically
responded to the shootdown, suspending its use of the United States
-Russia deconfliction line—a critical means of communication to
avoid direct conflict in Syria—and calling the United States’ strike
“a blatant breach of the international law” and “military aggression”

ourselves appropriately. And then as you highlight, we’ve got to work
through exactly who it was to understand that.
65
66
67

Central Command Press Release, supra note 3.
Id.
Letter from Samantha J. Power, supra note 47
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against the Syrian regime.68 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei
Ryabkov said the United States’ strike “has to be seen as a
continuation of America’s line to disregard the norms of
international law” and suggested that it was an “act of aggression.”69
Australia even suspended air strikes in Syria in response to what
appeared to be a very real threat of escalation.70
The June 18 shootdown was in fact unprecedented. It marked
the first time a United States “warplane has downed a manned
aircraft since 1999,” 71 and it was the first time the United States
justified force under international law as “collective self-defense of
Coalition partnered forces” where that partner was a non-state actor
and no United States servicemembers were at risk.72
In early August 2017, the State Department offered a more
detailed legal justification for the June 18 incident in a letter to
Senator Bob Corker. 73 The State Department justified the use of
68
Russian Ministry of Defense, Statement of the Russian Defence Ministry
Concerning Downing of the Syrian Su-22 near the Town of Resafa, FACEBOOK (June 19,
2017),
https://www.facebook.com/mod.mil.rus/posts/1943173689258711:0
[https://perma.cc/E7ZW-5XGH]; see Michael R. Gordon & Ivan Nechepurenko,
Russia Warns U.S. After Downing of Syrian Warplane, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/world/middleeast/russia-syria.html
[https://perma.cc/8MH2-QXJS]; U.S. Aviation Actions Against Syrian Armed Forces
are Gross Violation of Int’l Law, Military Aggression—Russian Defense Ministry,
INTERFAX (June 19, 2017, 4:21 PM), https://interfax.com/newsroom/topstories/27770/ [https://perma.cc/66JN-F8UC].
69
Patrick Wintour & Julian Borger, Russia Warns US its Fighter Jets are now
Potential Target in Syria, GUARDIAN (June 19, 2017, 2:41 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/19/russia-target-us-ledcoalition-warplanes-over-syria [https://perma.cc/YL4T-WUKZ].
70
See Australia suspends air strikes in Syria–government, REUTERS (June 20, 2017,
7:08
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-australiaidUSS9N1J304U [https://perma.cc/Z58B-LS74].
71
Ryan Browne, New details on US shoot down of Syrian jet, CNN (June 21, 2017,
10:17
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/21/politics/us-syria-russiadogfight/index.html [https://perma.cc/7CKX-4ZN5].
72
See Central Command Press Release, supra note 3.
73
See Letter from Charles Faulkner, Bureau of Legis. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of State,
to Bob Corker, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Rels. (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015d-a3bf-d43a-a3dd-b3bf14170000
[https://perma.cc/5KFT-RR6K]. Note that Charles Faulkner, the author of this
State Department letter, came under scrutiny in summer 2019 for his background
as an arms-industry lobbyist and his role in the Trump administration decision to
“sell weapons to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates without seeking
legislative approval.” Edward Wong & Catie Edmondson, Democrats to Scrutinize
Ex-Lobbyist’s Role in Trump’s Arms Sales to Gulf Nations, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/us/politics/democrats-charles-faulknerarms-sales.html [https://perma.cc/FE4P-3NAY].
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force under international law, explaining that the United States “is
using force in Syria against al-Qa’ida and associated forces,
including ISIS, and is providing support to Syrian partners fighting
ISIS, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces, in the collective self-defense
of Iraq (and other States) and in United States’ national self-defense.”74
These justifications are notable because they indicate the United
States government believed it could employ circuitous legal
arguments to take action against Syria in self-defense of the SDF.
b. Applying International Law to United States Action in Syria
The June 2017 shootdown raises thorny questions about the
application of self-defense doctrine to non-state actors. Article 51 of
the UN Charter guarantees the “inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations.”75 Evaluating the international legal basis for
United States action in Syria therefore requires assessing both the
individual and collective self-defense prongs for self-defense.
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of this analytic scheme:

74
75

Faulkner, supra note 71, at 1 (emphasis added).
See U.N. Charter art. 51.
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Figure 1: Can the United States Invoke Collective Self-Defense to
Protect the SDF?

Article 51:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . ."

Prong 1: Collective Self-Defense
Can the United States
invoke collective selfdefense on behalf of a
non-state partner that
has been attacked?

Prong 2: Individual Self-Defense
Can the United States
invoke its own individual
self-defense on behalf of
a non-state partner that
has been attacked?

First, does the SDF have a right to self-defense under
international law that can serve as a valid legal basis for United
States action in collective self-defense of the SDF? Second, can the
United States invoke its own right to individual self-defense to
justify its defense of the SDF? The answer to this question is more
nuanced than the first, but equally critical to understanding selfdefense of non-state actor groups. In short, United States action to
protect the SDF rests on shaky legal ground.
i.

Does a Non-State Actor Possess an Individual Right of SelfDefense that Allows a State to Act in Its Collective SelfDefense?

The text of Article 51 prima facie grants the inherent right of
collective and individual self-defense only to states. The UN Charter
binds only UN Member States, and thus “the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence” recognized by Article 51 is a
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right only of UN Member States. 76 Non-state actors are not UN
member states, and therefore they are not granted the kind of legal
personality under the Charter that would entitle them to an inherent
right to self-defense. This is the uncontroversial view held by
international legal scholars.77 To be sure, nothing in the UN Charter
negates the right of self-defense of non-UN Member States, and a
state actor that is not a UN member state can still assert an inherent
right to self-defense in the event of an armed attack under
customary international law. 78 This conclusion is supported by
Article 51’s reference to the right of self-defense as “inherent,”
thereby suggesting it emanates from natural law rather than positive
law and confirming that all states have an inherent right to selfdefense irrespective of their relationship to the UN. Writing in the
late 1950s, D.W. Bowett argued that this reference to an “inherent”
right in Article 51 indicates that self-defense “is an existing right,
independent of the Charter and not the subject of an express
grant . . . .” 79 But non-state actors are still not granted legal
personality under customary international law.
Understanding the right of self-defense as one that belongs only
to states is further confirmed by the drafting history of the UN
Charter, specifically Article 51, which Adil Haque has taken great
pains to excavate. The first draft of Article 51 read:

U.N. Charter art. 51.
See Georg Nolte & Albrecht Randelzhofer, Action with Respect to Threats,
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 51, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1397, 1420 (Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan,
Georg Nolte & Andreas Paulus eds., 3d ed. 2012) (“It is generally accepted that the
right of collective self-defence also authorizes a non-attacked State to lend its
assistance to an attacked State.”); Pothelet, supra note 4 (“[T]he Art. 51 right to
collective self-defense is only a right to defend other States, not non-State entities.
This flows from the nature of the UN Charter which is a treaty amongst States. This
reading of Art. 51 is uncontroversial in academic commentary.”) (internal hyperlink
omitted); Kinga Tibori-Szabó, The Downing of the Syrian Fighter Jet and Collective SelfDefence, OPINIO JURIS (June 23, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/06/23/thedowning-of-the-syrian-fighter-jet-and-collective-self-defence/
[https://perma.cc/5BCL-BZ7U]:
76
77

The question thus arises whether there is room for an expansive view on
the right of self-defence permitting a state to invoke ‘collective’ selfdefence on behalf of an armed group and assist the group on that basis.
The wording of Article 51 of the UN Charter leads to a prima facie negative
answer.
78
“Art. 51 cannot take away non-members’ rights of self-defence.” BOWETT,
supra note 18, at 193.
79
BOWETT, supra note 18, at 187.
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Should the Security Council not succeed in preventing
aggression, and should aggression occur by any state against
any member state, such member state possesses the inherent
right to take necessary measures for self-defense. The right
to take such measures for self-defense against armed attack
shall also apply to understandings or arrangements like
those embodied in the Act of Chapultepec, under which all
members of a group of states agree to consider an attack
against any one of them as an attack against all of them.80
This text makes clear that the drafters of the UN Charter
understood the right of self-defense as a right of states only. Article
51’s first iteration acknowledges that (1) aggression that leads to an
invocation of self-defense can only be committed by states, and (2)
an invocation of self-defense in such an instance can only be made
by a fellow state. Moreover, this first draft of Article 51 confirms
that collective self-defense was meant to recognize existing
collective defense regimes among states. Collective self-defense, as
enshrined in the UN Charter, was part of a compromise meant to
reassure Latin American states that the recently signed Act of
Chapultepec, a collective defense agreement among American
states, would remain permissible under international law.81
Due in large part to the global “War on Terror,” state practice
has morphed understandings of who can carry out an “armed
attack” under Article 51 to include non-state actors like al-Qaeda
and the Islamic State. This shift to acknowledge that non-state actors
might carry out an armed attack is in harmony with an
understanding of self-defense that preceded the UN Charter as
embodied in the Caroline Incident of 1837 when British Canadian
authorities attacked a steamer that was supporting Canadian rebels
in their fight for independence from colonial British rule. 82
However, there has been no similar shift in common understanding
80
Minutes of the Third Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on
Proposed Amendments (Part I), Held at San Francisco, Saturday, May 12, 1945, 2:30
p.m., in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1945,
GENERAL:
THE
UNITED
NATIONS,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v01/d224
[https://perma.cc/8LLF-BFDW]; see also Haque, supra note 33 (arguing that the UN
Charter’s preparatory documents indicate there is no right to self-defense against
an armed attack by a non-state actor).
81
See Haque, supra note 33.
82
See generally FORCESSE, supra note 18 (recounting the facts of the Caroline
Incident and the American legal and diplomatic response to citizens armed activities
against nations with which the United States was at peace).
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of who has an inherent right to self-defense under international law.
The consensus is that only states have such a right to self-defense.
Thus, the United States’ argument that it acted in collective selfdefense of the SDF to repel attacks by the Syrian regime has no
grounding in international law or the UN Charter. 83
In addition to the text and drafting history of the UN Charter,
proper functioning of the international order precludes a non-state
actor from asserting an inherent right of self-defense under
international law. Since the 1990s, there has been a marked shift
from international armed conflict to non-international armed
conflict (NIACs, or civil wars). 84 In the decade before 2014, the
“number of groups involved in civil conflicts [] quadrupled, most
dramatically in East and South Asia.”85 The rise of non-state actors
is already complicating the post-WWII international order, making
it harder to negotiate the resolution of ongoing conflicts, deliver
humanitarian aid, administer development programs, and address
countless other challenges.86
If a non-state group could assert self-defense under international
law, it would have debilitating consequences for the international
system. For example, if the Islamic State had an inherent right of
self-defense recognized under international law, the consequences
would be far-reaching. Such legal personality would enable the
Islamic State to lawfully wage war against states. But one need not
look at the extreme example of the Islamic State to understand the
83
Insofar as the SDF’s sole goal is to fight ISIS (and not regime change), at
least one international law scholar has cautiously argued United States collective
self-defense of the SDF in the global fight against the Islamic State might be lawful
under international law. Adil Ahmad Haque, On the Precipice: The U.S. and Russia
SECURITY
(June
19,
2017),
in
Syria,
JUST
https://www.justsecurity.org/42297/precipice-u-s-russia-syria
[https://perma.cc/Y4GL-GSUJ] (“In plain terms, the U.S. may have a legal right to
protect non-state partner forces who are exclusively ‘conducting legitimate counterISIS operations,’ but has no legal right to protect non-state partner forces who are
pursuing regime change or other political objectives.”).
84
See generally Tzimas, supra note 46.
85
See Brian Quinn & Fabio Oliva, Preliminary Scoping Report: Analyzing and
Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in the Field, United Nations System Staff College,
https://www.unssc.org/sites/unssc.org/files/unssc_report_final_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E6G9-YQPG]; THOMAS S. SZAYNA, STEPHEN WATTS, ANGELA
O’MAHONY, BRYAN FREDERICK & JENNIFER KAVANAGH, WHAT ARE THE TRENDS IN
ARMED CONFLICTS, AND WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR U.S. DEFENSE POLICY?, RAND
1,
CORP.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR
1904/RAND_RR1904.pdf [https://perma.cc/94FY-ZJVX].
86
See Quinn & Oliva, supra note 82, at 1-3.
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concerning result of elevating the legal status of non-state actors
under international law. If non-state armed groups had an inherent
right to self-defense, this would also fundamentally alter the status
of ongoing secessionist stalemates from Northern Ireland, to
Scotland, Cataluña, the Basque Country, Crimea, NagornoKarabakh, Republika Srpska, and more. In fact, “non-state” groups
and insurrection movements across the world would gain the legal
character they need to lawfully overthrow whole state systems.
In sum, a state cannot invoke collective self-defense as legal
justification to protect a non-state actor threatened by an armed
attack because neither customary international law nor Article 51 of
the UN Charter can be understood to apply to the defense of a nonstate actor. The right to self-defense under international law is a
right of states only.
ii.

Can the United States Invoke its Own Individual SelfDefense to Protect the SDF?

Although a state cannot use force in collective self-defense of a
non-state actor partner, may the state still lawfully invoke its own
individual self-defense on behalf of a non-state actor partner under
Article 51? One could argue that the State Department asserted as
much when it claimed “U.S. national self-defense” justified the 2017
shootdown of the manned Syrian aircraft to protect the SDF.87 The
United States asserted that the “use of force to defend U.S.,
Coalition, and U.S.-supported partner forces from threats by Syrian
Government and pro-Syrian Government forces” was lawful given
the United States’ “inherent right of individual and collective selfdefense.” 88 Thus, the United States appeared to believe that an
attack on the SDF was akin to an attack on the United States capable
of triggering its own right to individual self-defense.
1. The Scope of Individual Self-Defense
Individual self-defense under Article 51 is triggered when a UN
member state directly suffers an “armed attack.” Whether an attack
87
88

Faulkner, supra note 71.
Faulkner, supra note 71 (emphasis added).
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triggers individual self-defense hinges on what constitutes the
“individual” or “self” in the first place, and more specifically,
whether a non-state partner could possibly be included within the
umbrella of a partner state’s individual self-defense. The United
States’ legal argument in support of the 2017 shootdown of the
Syrian regime plane suggests the United States government
understands the SDF to be a critical part of its counter-ISIS
operation. But what if the SDF were essentially one and the same as
United States forces in Syria? Taking this line of thinking to its
extreme, an attack on the SDF would then be an attack on the United
States, and the United States could use force in individual selfdefense in such an event. The legitimacy of the United States’ claim
of individual self-defense on behalf of the SDF depends on whether
the United States can mount a convincing legal argument that the
SDF is part of the United States’ “self.”
The context of self-defense may also be crucial in determining
whether individual self-defense applies, specifically at a time when
counterterrorism operations dominate world affairs. The United
States has employed its right to individual self-defense against the
backdrop of the War on Terror, in which it sees itself as the ultimate
target of aggression. One could thus argue that an attack on a key
United States partner in counterterrorism operations could
conceivably threaten the individual safety of the United States.
Under this logic, an attack on the SDF is a direct attack on the United
States, and the United States can use force in individual self-defense
in such an event. The legitimacy of the United States’ claim of
individual self-defense on behalf of the SDF depends on whether the
United States can mount a convincing legal argument that an attack
on the SDF was indeed an attack on the United States.
Under international law, the scope of individual self-defense
tracks territoriality—consistent with the role of sovereignty in the
modern state system.89 Article 2(4) specifically prohibits the use of
force when it is directed against another state’s “territorial
integrity.” 90 This understanding informs the meaning of “armed
attack” in Article 51, which is primarily conceived in terms of an

89
See LUNG-CHU CHEN, Control over Territory, in AN INTRODUCTION TO
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 149, 149–54
(3d ed. 2015) (describing the traditional conception of territorial sovereignty as
constraining the permissible assertions of self-defense).
90
See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
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incursion of territorial integrity.91 The Syrian regime’s attack on the
SDF, thousands of miles from the United States mainland, could not
immediately trigger American individual self-defense in a strict
territorial sense. Thus, under Article 51, an attack on the SDF could
not possibly be construed as an “armed attack” on the United States
just on the basis of a partnership in the war on terror. Recall,
moreover, that in the American shootdown of the manned Syrian
aircraft in 2017, no American lives were at risk. Even under the
United States’ own definition of national self-defense, an attack on
the SDF in which no American lives were immediately at stake
would fail to trigger United States’ individual self-defense.92
But even if American nationals had been at risk in the 2017
shootdown, the right to individual self-defense by the United States
would still be far from guaranteed. The abstract target—not the
material target—often settles questions of individual self-defense
under international law.93 Even if an American national were killed
in an armed attack, it matters whether the death was simply
collateral to an attack aimed at another. The term “armed attack”
within the meaning of Article 51 requires the aggressor to have the
intention to attack the party purporting to be attacked. In the Oil
Platforms case, which concerned a United States warship that was
destroyed after striking a mine, the ICJ emphasized this requirement
by asking the United States to prove that Iran’s actions were “aimed
specifically” at the United States and that Iran had “the specific
intention” of harming United States vessels.94 That the security of
the United States was conceptually threatened by a Syrian regime
strike on the SDF would not suffice to trigger an American individual
self-defense right under Article 51.

91
Andrew W.R. Thomson, Doctrine of the Protection of Nationals Abroad: Rise of
the Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation, 11 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 627, 636
(2012).
92 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTR., 3121.01B, STANDING RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT (SROE)/STANDING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE (SRUF) FOR U.S.
FORCES 81, 83 (2005).
93
Öykü Irmakkesen, The Notion of Armed Attack under the UN Charter and
the Notion of International Armed Conflict—Interrelated or Distinct? 18 (Aug.,
2014) (LL.M. paper, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law &
Human Rights).
94
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 64 (Nov. 6).
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2. The SDF as a State Organ of the United States?
Only if the SDF were deemed part of the United States—in other
words, an extension of the United States whose defense could
legitimately be equated to the United States’ own self-defense—
could the United States properly invoke individual self-defense to
justify the June 2017 shootdown. Whether an attack triggers
individual self-defense hinges on what constitutes the “individual”
or “self,” and more specifically, whether a non-state partner could
possibly be included within the umbrella of a partner state’s
individual self-defense. The nature of the relationship between the
United States and SDF, including the level of United States control
over the SDF, then, becomes critical to determining whether the
United States could legitimately conflate defense of the SDF with its
own. Nothing in the relationship between the two indicates that the
SDF is a state organ of the United States.
For one, neither party believes it is in a state organ relationship
with the other. The United States has only employed the term
“partner forces” 95 to refer to the SDF, while the SDF, in its
declaration of establishment, 96 considers itself to be a multiethnic
coalition among thirteen regional signatories, none of which is the
United States. Under Article 4(2) of the International Law
Commission (ILC)’s 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, a
state organ is defined as “any person or entity which has that status
in accordance with the internal law of the state.”97 The SDF clearly
does not meet this standard, by virtue of its founding document. A
party may also be a de facto organ of a state in “exceptional”
circumstances in which it acts in “complete dependence on the State,
of which [it is] ultimately merely the instrument.”98 The SDF does
Faulkner, supra note 71.
Declaration of Establishment by Democratic Syria Forces, KURDISH QUESTION
(Oct.
15,
2015),
https://web.archive.org/web/20160224085811/http://kurdishquestion.com/ind
ex.php/kurdistan/west-kurdistan/declaration-of-establishment-by-democraticsyria-forces/1179-declaration-of-establishment-by-democratic-syria-forces.html
[https://perma.cc/7Z9X-DACV].
97
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, at 26 (2001).
98
Application of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 392–
93 (Feb. 26). The language of ‘complete dependence’ is taken from Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 110 (June 27).
95
96
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not meet this exceptional standard either. In fact, it has an alleged
relationship with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), deemed by
the European Union as a terrorist organization.99 In the absence of
an armed attack or the threat of an armed attack against the United
States, the only conceivable path through which the United States
could lawfully invoke its own individual self-defense on behalf of
the SDF is if the SDF were a part of the United States, but such a
relationship does not exist.
Individual self-defense has undoubtedly expanded beyond
geographic demarcations to include nationals, properties, and forces
abroad. Under customary international law, a state’s individual
self-defense may be triggered when its nationals, including its
soldiers, come in harm’s way abroad.100 Take, for instance, Canada’s
military operation in July 2006 to evacuate 14,000 of its citizens amid
the armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, or the more
controversial Russian invocation of self-defense to protect its
citizens abroad in 2008 when Moscow sent troops, tanks, and aircraft
into Georgia.101 The United States’ Standing Rules of Engagement
(SROE) specifically define “national self-defense” as the “act of
defending the United States, United States forces, and in certain
circumstances, United States citizens and their property and/or
United States commercial assets, from a hostile act, demonstrated
hostile intent, or declared hostile force.”102 But these expansions—
themselves controversial under treaty law103—have never reached
the extent of subsuming the defense of another entity into a state’s
own individual self-defense. In no way has the scope of individual
self-defense grown to include the protection of entities completely
separate from the individual state, like non-state partnered forces.
The upshot of this analysis is that there is no room in Article 51
for member UN states, like the United States, to invoke self-defense
on behalf of non-state partners to violate the Article 2(4) prohibition
99
Wladimir van Wilgenburg, Syrian Democratic Forces (Syria), EUROPEAN
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://ecfr.eu/special/mena-armed-groups/syriandemocratic-forces-syria/ [https://perma.cc/S4HG-BUYX].
100
Thomson, supra note 88, at 639.
101
See id. at 628 (offering these two cases as examples of states launching
military operations to assist their citizens in foreign states and that such operations
are legally justified).
102
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTR., 3121.01B, STANDING RULES
OF ENGAGEMENT (SROE)/STANDING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE (SRUF) FOR U.S.
FORCES 81, 83 (2005).
103
See Thomson, supra note 88, at 645 (“Attempts to firmly establish the
doctrine of protection in treaty law have not been successful.”).
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on the use of force. An invocation of collective self-defense by the
United States would depend on the non-state actor’s own right of
individual self-defense, which does not exist under the UN system.
The remaining Article 51 alternative—the invocation of individual
self-defense by the United States—also fails unless the armed attack
in the meaning of Article 51 occurs against the United States, or the
SDF is to be considered a state organ of the United States. Neither
argument is likely to succeed under international law.
IV.

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

Invoking individual self-defense to protect a non-state actor
partner is problematic for another reason: if any state could lawfully
claim individual self-defense as the basis for its use force on behalf
of a non-state partner, the state would necessarily assume
responsibility for the actions of its non-state partner under
international law. This Part knits together the literature on
individual self-defense and state responsibility to argue that when a
state invokes individual self-defense of a non-state partner as its
state organ, that state must also assume responsibility for that nonstate partner under international law. Thus, this Part furthers the
novel legal argument that a state must take legal responsibility for a
non-state partner’s conduct if it simultaneously seeks to equate its
own self-defense to the defense of its organ.
As discussed in Part III, in the absence of an armed attack against
a state, the only legitimate way a state can invoke individual selfdefense on behalf of another entity would imply a state organ
relationship such that the self-defense of the state becomes equated
with that of its non-state partner. By invoking individual selfdefense in this manner, the state essentially exports its umbrella of
sovereignty to the non-state partner, which cannot access such
sovereignty-derived rights on its own. The invocation is, in effect, a
denial of the status of the non-state partner as a legally distinct
entity. 104 More importantly, the invocation denotes that the state
104
Note that in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States), the United States relied on its inherent right of collective
self-defense, not of individual self-defense. See Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 24 (June 27)
(noting that while the United States did not formally file a pleading on the merits,
“it claim[ed] to be acting in reliance on the inherent right of self-defence
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exercises a level of control over the non-state partner that itself
would trigger a new set of responsibilities. Figure 2 captures this
line of reasoning, involving the dialectic between self-defense and
control and the role of “control” as the gateway to state
responsibility.
Figure 2: How Individual Self-Defense Implicates Control and State
Responsibility
Individual
Self-Defense

Control

State
Responsibility

Although the issue of control has not been explicitly discussed
in the literature with respect to self-defense on behalf of non-state
partners, the link between individual self-defense and control is one
repeatedly emphasized in scholarship on non-state actors more
generally, especially regarding self-defense against non-state
aggressors.105 Christian Tams notes that self-defense involving nonstate actors always implicates issues of control because all non-state
actors operate from a “foreign (host) state” and the state-centric UN
regime is, at its core, written in the vocabulary of state
sovereignty. 106 Since the beginning of the UN Charter, debates
regarding armed non-state groups have always centered on the role
of their “sponsoring States” and on how best to ascertain the degree
of control of these states over non-state actors, for attribution
purposes. 107 Writing in 1958, Ian Brownlie also noted that the
problem of non-state actors was fundamentally one of “[s]tate
complicity in, or toleration of, the activities of armed bands directed
against other [s]tates.”108 Themis Tzimas also describes non-state
‘guaranteed . . . by Article 51 of the Charter’ of the United Nations, that is to say the
right of collective self-defence.”).
105
See Marxsen, supra note 54, at 2 (noting that under the standard of effective
control, an “attacked State may take necessary and proportionate action against the
State from whose territory the non-State actors operate, because the acts of the nonState actors are—from a legal perspective—those of the State.”).
106
Tams, supra note 45, at 130, 172.
107
See Tams, supra note 45, at 130 (“From 1946 until around the late 1980s, ….
from Burma/China (1953) to the French raids on Tunisia in the late 1950s and the
manifold Israeli strikes against Palestinian targets in Jordan, Lebanon, and
elsewhere—the focus was squarely on the respective host States.”).
108
Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 712, 734 (1958).
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actors in terms of their relationship to sovereignty, arguing that a
non-state group, by definition, fragments the authority of the
territorial state it occupies, triggering questions of sovereignty,
control, and authority. 109 Both the “unwilling and unable” and
“effective control” doctrines, which figure prominently in current
international legal debates around non-state actors,110 are ultimately
an exercise in squeezing non-state conflict into the sovereigntybased equation of Article 51 self-defense.111 Against this backdrop,
claiming “individual” self-defense over another entity (as opposed
to collective self-defense) indicates that the state exercises a level of
control over a non-state partner, without which self-defense over
that entity could not be deemed “individual.”
a. State Organ Standard
The 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility (“Draft Articles”)
promulgated by the International Law Commission (ILC) serve as
the most established authority on state responsibility and control.112
The ICJ accepted both Articles 4 and 8 of the Draft Articles as
customary international law as of 2007.113 Under Draft Article 4, the
“conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State
under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any functions, whatever position it holds in the
organization of the State and whatever its character as an organ of
the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.”114 Under
Draft Article 8, the “conduct of a person or group of persons shall be
109
110
111

Tzimas, supra note 46, at 185.
Marxsen, supra note 54, at 2, 6.
See Tzimas, supra note 46, at 185:

In other words, the legal personality of non-state actors, especially in the
frame- work of Areas of Limited Sovereignty or Statehood (ALSs) due to
NIACs and INIACs, is the outcome of the need of state sovereignty to
adjust, normatively speaking, to its own deficiencies and is determined on
the basis of the dialectic relationship between the capacities of the nonstate actor and the defects of the fragmented sovereignty of the state. The
latter necessitate and justify the former.
112
Oona A. Hathaway, Emily Chertoff, Lara Dominguez,Zachary Manfredi &
Peter Tzeng, Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article 1 and State Responsibility for
Non-State Actors, 95 TEX. L. REV. 539, 546 (2017).
113
Id.
114
Id. at 546-47 (quoting Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its FiftyThird Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/1., at 26–30 (2011)).
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considered an act of a State under international law, if the person or
group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”115 In
other words, a non-state actor’s act could be attributable to a state if
the state has connections with the actor (Draft Article 4) or with the
operation itself (Draft Article 8).116
The ILC, in its commentary to Draft Article 4, adds that a “[s]tate
cannot avoid responsibility for the conduct of a body which does in
truth act as one of its organs merely by denying it that status under
its own law.” 117 This indicates that once control has been
established, international law “pierces the veil” in the proxy
relationship between a state and a non-state actor, holding the
sponsoring state liable for the acts of the latter. Because the only
legitimate pathway for the United States to claim its right of
individual self-defense on behalf of the SDF is by acknowledging it
as a state organ, the United States would be responsible for the
conduct of the SDF under international law.
b. Effective Control Standard
In addition to the ILC Draft Articles, international tribunals have
relied on a range of “control tests” to deduce the scope of state
responsibility for non-state actor conduct. But courts have rarely
found states liable for the conduct of non-state actors under these
control tests. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua), the ICJ established in 1984 that for a state to
be held responsible for the actions of a non-state actor, “it would in
principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the
military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the
alleged violations were committed.”118 Notably, the ICJ ruled that,
even though the United States financed, organized, trained,
supplied, equipped, and provided reconnaissance aircraft,
intelligence, and surveillance to the paramilitaries, its involvement
was insufficient for a finding of “substantial involvement” required
115
See id. at 547 (quoting Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its FiftyThird Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/1., art. 8 (2011)).
116
Id. at 546.
117
See id. at 547 (quoting Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its FiftyThird Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/1., art. 4 cmt. 11 (2011)).
118
See id. at 549 (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27)).
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for state responsibility.119 As Oona Hathaway notes, the effective
control test in Nicaragua set a high evidentiary bar for demonstrating
control, requiring “proof of control over a specific operation . . .
directly connecting a state’s funding . . . to the execution of a discrete
internationally wrongful act” for a finding of attribution.120
The 2007 ICJ judgment in Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnian
Genocide) 121 further entrenched the high evidentiary burden for
control. The case concerned whether acts of genocide committed by
members of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS)—a non-state actor—
could be attributed to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY),
which had sponsored the VRS. Despite evidence demonstrating
“substantial economic integration” between the FRY and VRS, as
well as a major transfer of arms and equipment to the VRS, the ICJ
did not find attribution absent evidence of “explicit instructions to
commit the massacre,” including evidence of genocidal intent. 122
Moreover, even with a finding of effective control, the International
Law Commission (ILC), which has endorsed the ICJ’s effective
control standard, further narrows state liability to cover only acts
that are “an integral part” of the operation, so that the sponsoring
state is not responsible for ultra vires acts that are “incidentally or
peripherally” associated with an operation.123
c. The Application of State Responsibility to the United States-SDF
Relationship
The high threshold for control makes it difficult to attribute
violations of international law by non-state actors to their

See id. at 550; Tams, supra note 45, at 133.
Hathaway et al., supra note 109, at 550 (“The opinion implied that this was
because Nicaragua had failed to prove a direct link between these forms of support
and the execution of any particular operation, i.e., the United States had not
specifically instructed the commission of unlawful acts.”).
121
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 26).
122
See Hathaway et al., supra note 109, at 551. Another standard, the overall
control test, was created by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, with a lower threshold for establishing “control” between a sponsoring
state and a non-state organ. See Hathaway et al., supra note 109, at 546.
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Hathaway et al., supra note 109, at 553.
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sponsoring states. Against the backdrop of states increasingly 124
using non-state actors as proxies to accomplish their military and
political objectives, this high threshold for control creates an
accountability gap that renders attribution of non-state violations to
their state sponsors without extremely specific evidence practically
impossible. 125 It also reinforces perverse incentives for states to
engage via their non-state proxies in conduct they themselves could
not lawfully pursue.
But for purposes of Article 51 self-defense, the high threshold for
control is precisely what makes it difficult to characterize the selfdefense of non-state partners as “individual” self-defense. In order
to legitimate a claim of individual self-defense, a state would have
to demonstrate such a level of control over a non-state partner as
could be recognized under international law.
In 2015, the United States supported the SDF with more than
forty-five tons of weapons and ammunition, in addition to special
operations forces and precision U.S. combat airpower that led to key
victories in Manbij, Raqqa, and the final ISIS holdout of Baghouz.126
Even then, the actual control exercised by the United States over the
SDF falls short of both the ILC Draft Articles’ state organ standard
and the Nicaragua effective control standard. This lack of control
undermines the United States’ rationale for a claim of individual
self-defense over a non-state partner. Moreover, a legitimate
invocation of individual self-defense on behalf of a non-state partner
would be possible, but only after it has opened a pandora’s box of

A.B.A. CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, REPORT ON
FRAMEWORK REGULATING PROXY WARFARE (Dec. 2019). See generally
WARFARE
PROJECT,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/reports/report-legalframework-regulating-proxy-warfare-2019/
[https://perma.cc/25D4-333C]
(“Global and regional powers increasingly rely on state and non-state partners in
the course of ongoing hostilities.”).
125
Hathaway et al., supra note 109, at 540-41:
124

THE LEGAL
PROXY

States frequently work with and through non-state actors, sometimes in
cases where direct state action would have been politically or legally
suspect. During the past few years, for example, the United States has
financed, armed, and trained opposition forces in Syria. Russia has
assisted and supplied separatist forces in eastern Ukraine. Iran continues
to arm and fund Hezbollah in Lebanon.
126
See Mick Mulroy & Eric Oehlerich, A tale of two partners: Comparing two
approaches for partner force operations, MIDDLE EAST INST. (Jan. 29, 2020),
https://www.mei.edu/publications/tale-two-partners-comparing-twoapproaches-partner-force-operations [https://perma.cc/9HEU-9K6G].
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state responsibility which a sponsoring state like the United States
would not seek out in the first place.
A strange dialectic thus emerges: control becomes something
that a State must simultaneously avoid to escape responsibility for
the non-state body and embrace to legitimate its own claim of
individual self-defense over that body. A valid claim of individual
self-defense on behalf of the SDF would thus force the United States
to be legally responsible for SDF actions. For the United States, it
becomes impossible to rent its right of individual self-defense to the
SDF without also acknowledging a state organ relationship that
would open it to liability for illegal conduct of the SDF.
V. CONCLUSION
Just over seventy-five years ago, the world came together and
inked the most fundamental international rule of all: the prohibition
on the use of military force for anything but self-defense.127 That
self-defense exception, codified at Article 51 of the UN Charter, was
extremely narrow by design.128 But over the years, and especially
since September 11, the scope of this exception, originally conceived
as applying to states only, has morphed beyond recognition to
include non-state actors. Largely overlooked, the emergence of selfdefense on behalf of non-state partners in Syria is a novel twist that
threatens the existence of the global system by reducing its most
foundational rule to a technical speedbump.
Two factors explain why this recent doctrinal expansion has
evaded meaningful attention, much less resistance, despite the
outsized consequences. For one, it is subtle. Non-state actors like
al-Qaeda, especially in a post-9/11 world, already appear to be
legitimate targets of force under international law. What is one more
twist in seeking to make them legitimate beneficiaries of defense?
Second, the latest expansion of self-defense has the luxury of
political expedience. Both liberal internationalists repulsed by
Syria’s Assad regime and neoconservative realists in favor of
America’s military supremacy have had no particular reason to be
more vocal against the unlawful expansion of self-defense by the
United States.129
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But the 2017 shootdown of a Syrian plane by the United States is
a clear violation of international law. The legal justification
provided—self-defense of the SDF—has no basis in Article 51
jurisprudence. The SDF, as a non-state actor, has no right to selfdefense that could provide the legal basis for the United States’
strike on Syria in collective self-defense. Nor can the United States
claim that the Syrian attack on the SDF constituted an “armed
attack” capable of triggering its own right of individual self-defense
within the meaning of Article 51. The only remaining potential
alternative—that the SDF was embedded in American
counterterrorism operations as a state organ—is not only factually
inaccurate, but would also trigger specific legal obligations under
the state responsibility doctrine that the United States has failed to
fulfill.
The 2017 invocation of self-defense by the United States on
behalf of the SDF was the first of its kind, but certainly not the last.
In 2018, the United States would again invoke the self-defense of its
non-state partner to justify the use of military force against Syria.130
There are no additional documented instances of self-defense on
behalf of non-state partners since 2018, but history shows that when
the United States bends the law, it often sets a dangerous precedent
that other states follow.131
What the United States did in Syria threatens to trigger the
beginning of the end of the global system. It indicates that by simply
designating an aggrieved non-state group in any conflict in any
region of the world as a “partner,” any willing state may invoke the
collective self-defense of that partner to lawfully use military force
against another sovereign state that poses no direct threat to its
counterpart(s). Left unchecked, this expansion of Article 51 selfdefense effectively voids the Charter’s Article 2(4) ban on force by
turning self-defense precisely into a generous vehicle—rather than
a narrow exception—through which to justify military action.
Article 2(4) is central to the modern international order as we
know it—a world where war is outlawed and force can be used in
only a small number of instances. Efforts to weaken Article 2(4)’s
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prohibition on the use of force must be met with fierce opposition to
prevent its death by a thousand cuts.
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